Ronald Dworkin’s theory of justice and a legal analysis of affirmative action programs

Abstract

The present work aims at legally analyzing the policies of affirmative action inserted in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of justice, placed in the doctrine entitled liberal egalitarianism. Firstly, it is presented the Dworkinian conception of equality and how the quotas program, if efficient, could suit this approach. In a second moment, the matters of policy and principle are distinguished, indicating the importance of such distinction from the law’s point of view and how it can provide juridical legitimacy to the affirmative actions. Forth on, the possible interpretations that the United States Constitution can grant to the right to non-racial discrimination are interpreted. Finally, the last two sections are dedicated to the distinction between two types of equality and to the analysis of rights potentially opposed to the quota policies. The conclusion is that affirmative action programs are legitimate from the liberal egalitarianism perspective as well as from the legal standpoint.